The 2009 Hancock Lecture

Was the Twentieth Century the Great Age of Internationalism?

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If I were to imagine this lecture as a movie, the opening scene would be a contemporary one:

23 September 2009, an early dusk descends upon a glimmering New York, the camera pans across the cityscape and East River to stop at the gates of the imposing UN building, it tightens up on a besuited figure standing in the great building’s lobby.

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We cut to a flood of more men, a few women, purposefully finding their seats, and back and forth between the sombre setting of the large General Assembly Hall, and the obviously important individual carefully padding down the UN corridors, sheafs in hand, ready to make his entrance to the podium that has by now captured the silent attention of the audience assembled for the 64th session of the General Assembly, that international forum of the world’s nations. So much is at stake, global financial meltdown; and that other melting taking place on the earth’s polar caps (we know because we hear the audience of delegates whispering these themes in urgent tones). The rapturous applause begins, and our hero takes the stand to launch into his speech.

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The speech I am imagining is an amalgam of two speeches by Kevin Rudd in 2008 and 2009 in the context of a global economic crisis, and, to a lesser extent, the challenges of climate change. They were also, in parts, paens to what I want to describe as twentieth century internationalism. They referred us back in time to San Francisco, 1945, to the meeting that drafted the UN Charter with its invocation of ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations’, and the founding moment of the UN as the beginning of a new approach to the global challenges of peace and survival facing humanity, to Australia’s key place (thanks to an earlier Labor minister Herbert Evatt) in the process of developing global forms of governance and an international-mindedness.

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I will come back to the Prime Minister and San Francisco later on. For now they serve to set the scene for the question I have posed for this lecture — was the twentieth century the great age of internationalism? This question invites an investigation of the history of internationalism itself. And here my cinematic vision already begins to run into trouble. Where in time will my first flashback
take us? To the late eighteenth century and Jeremy Bentham’s coinage of the term international as an appellation for law that extended beyond the state, governing the ‘mutual transactions of sovereigns’? Or Immanuel Kant’s cosmopolitan vision of permanent peace among nations? To the mid-nineteenth century, when Giuseppe Mazzini proposed a progressive vision of ever-widening concentric circles of association — in which nations existed as a stage of political and social evolution, linking the family to humanity? Or to the publication of the Communist manifesto in 1848, and its call to the workers of the world to unite — an event that chronologically coincided with the coinage in English and French of the term internationalism? After all, the emphasis of ‘proletarian internationalism’ on radical economic change and democratisation dominated the political and popular view of the status and import of internationalism well into the twentieth century, even as a middle-class version of internationalism took centre stage. I want to argue that there is a twentieth-century internationalism that bears the weight of all these intellectual and political legacies (and more), but which has clearer roots in liberalism and in the period that historians such as Akira Iriye have begun to describe as formative of a ‘cultural internationalism’. Of course, if I were presenting a different lecture on the turn of the twentieth century, I could identify this same period as the apogee of nationalism — an era that produced the Australian nation-state as well as the new phenomenon of the international organisation and a new self-conscious internationalism. Indeed if we are to do justice to the histories of either nationalism or internationalism it is important to keep their intersecting histories in mind.

By the turn of the twentieth century, Europeans began to reflect on internationalism as an ‘objective social fact’. By this they meant less the evidence of economic interconnectedness that we find already in the late eighteenth century, and more the sudden appearance of an international sphere of organisations that paralleled the invention of national institutions. Each year of the 1890s, ten new Non-Governmental Organisations [NGO] identifiable by their ‘international’ titles, made their appearance in this new international public sphere. These included institutions with very specific cultural bents, such as the International Red Cross, and the Young Men’s Christian Association, as well as, in 1895, an International Academy of Humanities. The numbers are more staggering when we remember that before 1850 there were only five NGOs in existence. The florescence of international NGOs was matched by the proliferation of international inter-governmental organisations (or IGOs) such as the Universal Postal Union, the International Telegraph Union, the International Sanitary Council, each effecting some form of standardisation on an international scale, whether of weights and measures, postal and telegraphic rates, or the management of communicable diseases — a development that paralleled the centralisation of public services on national scales in this same period. By 1910, the expansion of international organisations (IGOs and NGOs) had reached such proportions that a new international
organisation came into being whose main purpose was to represent all these international organisations, this was the Union of International Associations (Union des Association internationales, UAI), founded in Brussels with its own ‘world congresses of international associations’ and publications, La Vie Internationale.

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The Hague peace conference of 1899, on the cusp of the new twentieth century, symbolised this new self-conscious internationalism, and the thickening of the international as a political sphere, the palpable sense of internationalism as an ‘objective social fact’. Even though the conference was called by the Russian Tsar for purposes of realpolitik (as a way of keeping up with the arms race between German and England but demanding controls on armaments), it resulted in new international machinery that provided the institutional benchmark of the new internationalism and its ties to pacifism and its legal focus, including a convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and The Hague Convention on laws and customs of law on land, with its significant impact on the development of humanitarian law.

Historians also remind us that the Hague 1899 conference achieved nothing immediate in terms of its disarmament aims, although it did lead to the plans for the building of the Hague peace palace, funded by Carnegie money, and finished in 1913, as a symbol of a new internationalism and its ranging pacifist, socialist, and liberal democratic ambitions. More importantly, I would argue, the Hague conference brought nationally unenfranchised individuals — including women and increasingly colonised subjects — into political life. At the Hague conference delegates were inundated by plans, schemes, nostrums, notions and whimsies of all sorts. The British Foreign Office alone received over 750 resolutions from peace societies, religious groups, town and county councils endorsing the conference disarmament aims. Many of these petitions were motivated by a fear of the escalating militarism they traced back to rampant nationalism. The relevant point here is that this new internationalism was an appreciably public phenomenon. It was also a basis for broad-based democratic and political claim-making that peaked during periods of crisis and desperation.

In the twentieth century there was no shortage of such imperatives.

We need look no further than the desperate anti-heroic throes of the First World War. Some of you might already be thinking of the classic texts of this period, including the English Bloomsbury figure and Fabian Leonard Woolf’s 1916 essay on International Government, in which he argued that beginnings of international government already existed — as conventions, committees, and organisations upholding international interests (of the kind introduced by the Hague conference).

Or from a different political angle, and place, Leon
Trotsky’s 1917 observation that the war raised ‘to new heights the feelings of “universality”, of awareness of the indissoluble tie between the fate of an individual and the fate of all mankind’.vi

My own favourite text comes from Ellen Key writing in 1915 for an American newspaper reading public.vii Key was a Swedish self-styled feminist with an enormous following in Europe and the US in particular — a woman described by the English ‘sexologist’ Havelock Ellis prior to the war ‘as one of the chief moral forces of our time’. For our purposes, her articles usefully point up themes that dominated this increasingly mainstream interpretation of internationalism that was capturing political imaginations:

- That the nation was as utopian as internationalism.
- That internationalism involved potentially the creation of a ‘world organisation’ as an important political means of bringing about permanent peace.
- That international law was critical to the realism of internationalism.
- That internationalism required a psychological effort, a state of mind.
- That (conversely)
  - nations would be maintained in the inevitable widening of association into internationalism;
  - national patriotism had to be incorporated into internationalism for it to work;
  - a national personality corresponded with internationalism.
- That the relationship of cosmopolitanism to internationalism required some rethinking.
- That internationalism was critical for the future of Europe.
- That women had something to say about this form of political life.

One of the most illuminating aspects of Key’s discussion of internationalism was her perception of it as an emotional or psychological force. In part, this mirrored contemporary early twentieth-century interest in understanding nationalism as a psychological phenomenon (at a time when psychology was in its infancy and establishing its disciplinary forms). The psychological basis of internationalism was a theme taken up by a range of social and natural scientists who were usually concerned with providing a scientific foundation for political life. We find the American psychologist Morton Prince exhorting in 1916 that psychology had now enabled man to dream of ‘A world consciousness in international relations’ through the insight it offered into man’s individual striving.viii And a less exuberant Walter Pillsbury, based at Michigan University, appending to his 1919 study of national psychology a chapter on the possibility that a League of Nations was ‘an obvious next step in the development of a social organisation, and the social instincts and the social ideals and habits offer sufficient basis for its development and for its proper functioning when it has been developed’.ix We also find the English economist J.A. Hobson, the
author of perhaps the best-known critique of British imperialism and of patriotic jingoism, outlining, also in 1919, the year of peace-making and League of Nations-making, his theory of ‘International Man’.

During the war, Hobson the social scientist had begun to consider the ways in which new theories of psychology challenged the view of ‘individuals’ posited by the Enlightenment as ‘hard-headed, intelligent, self-centred monads, each vigorously asserting his rights’. Instead, psychological theories now allowed for the ‘readjustment of personality demanded by the objective internationalism which is taking place’.

Similar themes perpetuated the Norwegian Christian Lange’s acceptance speech for the 1921 Nobel peace prize awarded for his work on behalf of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, an inter-governmental institution set up in late nineteenth-century, and in some historical accounts regarded as the seed of League. It was a time when the Nobel prize was in the springtime of its credibility — although it is disconcerting to discover that Lange was Norwegian and had himself worked for the Nobel Committee.

Nevertheless, in his Nobel acceptance speech, Lange utilised the popular theories of group psychology and germ plasm theory to ground this new political interpretation of internationalism. He insisted that ‘nationality’ was a spiritual phenomenon that could not be eradicated. The rub was that in order for nations to survive they had to become more international, or they would wipe each other out.

Lange, like Hobson, also thought it important to distinguish cosmopolitanism from internationalism precisely because of the profound psychological significance of national patriotism. Hobson went so far as to explain that in presenting his international man, he was ‘not putting forward the merely “sentimental philanthropist” the wordy, shallow “cosmopolitan”, as a saner type than the honest capable citizen with narrower sympathies.’ Indeed, Hobson’s defensiveness is a salutary reminder that in the early stages of the First World War conservative English papers had equated the idea of a League of Nations with international Jewry — another neat fact that more than hints at the many working meanings of internationalism at this time, its intersecting history with that other political spectre, cosmopolitanism. It helps explain too just why there was so much discussion about its relationship to national loyalty and patriotism.

Ellen Key for her part thought of cosmopolitanism as a positive soulful value corresponding to the ‘inner condition’ of people in the East, namely certain Russians and kindred souls such as the Indian philosopher Rabindranath Tagore. In the West, where, she argued, internationalism was only a power in commercial and intellectual discourse, there was not yet such a thing, although a first
step might be made through the cultivation of ‘Europeanism’ as a feeling of kinship and spontaneous cooperation.xiii

There were some quirky aspects to Key’s internationalism tied to her specific understanding of feminism, but in general her views reflected the ideological tenor of progressives engaging internationalism in the political and civilisational abyss of the war years. This included a notable tone of imminent radical change — a theme that inevitably lost some of its novelty as it was perennially rehearsed through the twentieth century. In the European summer of 1919, the British geologist Mrs Ogilvie Gordon — an important figure in British National Council of Women, who was also unsuccessfully trying to convince the new League of Nations secretariat to put her on its Boundary commission, called for a ‘New Patriotism’ to match the new times: ‘the threshold of a new era which the historian of the future will probably term the Era of Internationalism.’xiv

Which brings me to the League itself. The League was without doubt the most significant symbolic manifestation of this new era or age of internationalism, based in Geneva (rather than the Hague), and answering to the proletarian internationalism of the nineteenth century. One of the best approaches to this history is Frank Moorhouse’s gloriously seductive ‘factional’ account of the League, *Grand Days*, which captures the intricacies social, political, public, private of international woman as well as man, and the involvement of an Australian internationalist: Edith Campbell Berry, modelled on a Canadian League of Nations’ administrator, Mary McGeachy, whose real life was much more sordid than even Moorhouse could make Edith’s. Alternatively, it is useful to recall the spirit of Geneva conceptualised as ‘a state of mind’, as much as a series of agreements or set of institutions, seen through the very real person, the British diplomat Harold Nicolson. In May 1919 as the League of Nations Covenant was being drafted as part of the Paris peace process, Nicolson wrote about a ‘League temperament’ to his wife, the writer Vita Sackville-West — who he knew was at the time busy pursuing her attraction to Violet Trefusis (and he might have been on with the Greek PM, Venizelos, whose own wife was sapphically inclined) [internationalism had its sexy side, here I genuflect again to the genius of Frank Moorhouse], but this is Nicolson:

Look here, when you have nothing to do, will you please think sometimes about the League? You see, you have got to get a ‘League temperament’ ready to help me when I become too national and anti-dago. If the League is to be of any value it must start from a new conception, and involve among its promoters and leaders a new habit of thought. […]
So we must become anti-English when necessary, and, when necessary, pro-Italian. Thus when you find me becoming impatient of the Latins you must snub me. It is rather a wrench for me — as I like the sturdy, unenlightened, unintellectual, fuzzy (sic?) British way of looking at things. I fear the ‘Geneva temperament’ will be rather Hampstead Garden Suburb — but the thing may be immense.
We must work for it. […] My feeling about the League is that it is a great experience and I want you to feel rather protective about it.xv

Underneath Nicolson’s epistolary playfulness and obvious class sarcasm (and its intriguing association of internationalism with middle-class rather than proletarian values), there is a very real sense that this League-focused internationalism was invested in the concept of international democracy — of cultures as much as classes as well as a supra-national ‘state of mind’.

The League of Nations was a new kind of institution based on international law, a legal entity with rights, obligations institutions, and with its own permanent staff of the kind imagined by Woolf. The League’s setting up of a secretariat (on the British public service model) also led to discussion of loyalty to an international organisation — a bureaucratic international patriotism — a concept that was relatively novel in this simultaneous age of nationalism, and in an international organisation that was itself firmly an agent of the ‘principle of nationality’ as the key to world security.

Other aspects of this new institutionalised internationalism are worth noticing, including the attempt to demarcate international territories, whereby the League was to act as the trustee for the government of disputed territory (for example, the disputed Saar Valley), or even as guarantor and government for territory designated as ‘international’ (The Free City of Danzig, the first ‘international city’ as it were). League-related treaties oversaw and guaranteed the recognition of the rights of religious and racial minorities in some of the countries of Central Europe — recognition that was by intent the superimposition of international law over domestic, and the construction of a kind of international citizenship, albeit on the grounds of essential ethnic states.xvi

There were significant social and economic dimensions too to this early twentieth century internationalism: a new International Labour Charter (covering areas such as social insurance, the protection of women before and after child-birth, the regulation of night work for women and children); and of course the creation of the International Labour Organisation, that institutional sop to Bolshevism where in practice many mid-twentieth century democratic progressives cut their international teeth.

And even as much scholarship focuses on the absence of the United States as a state member of this new organisation (there were Americans enough in its administration), the breadth of the League’s political membership is also worth reflecting on as an important dimension of its international reputation. It had 42 founding members plus 21 later members. At its peak in 1935 the League ranged alphabetically from Afghanistan to Venezuela.xvii This list of members — like the mix of its secretariat personnel — suggests a history that takes us beyond the confines of an
Anglo-American or purely European story, even as individuals from Western Europe, the Commonwealth and the Americas dominated. Despite a significantly European secretariat, it was also a space where (as Moorhouse’s narrative suggests), individuals from various parts of the world discovered their ‘international selves’.

The other important aspect of the League of course, is the extent to which the idea, if not the final form, relied upon the support of popular organisations — sometimes international feminist organisations, but more specifically League of Nations associations.

To be sure, different groups saw in internationalism, and the League itself, possibilities for claiming a place in the world. Marilyn Lake, Fiona Paisley, and other Australian historians have discussed the League as women’s great white hope (with the emphasis on the white) — including the prospect of equal rights to jobs. This was not least because women remained without rights in most national spheres in the interwar period, most enduringly in Switzerland itself. This meant the majority of the world’s women, were drawn to the new international organisation as a means of having a voice.xviii

Yet one does not have to be particularly cynical to observe that the League represented the values of liberal imperialism as much as liberal democracy. Even though racial equality was mooted as a possible clause for the League’s Covenant (and indeed it is sometimes forgotten, it was supported by a majority of the war’s winners deciding the terms of the peace), thanks to the influence of Australia and the US in particular, that clause was dropped.xix Instead, the League instituted a mandate system to cover the colonial territories of the losers. Enshrined in Article XXII of the League’s Covenant, this system brought together images of the League as the defender of nationality and as the overseer of an international hierarchy of races evolving into nations, rather than of nations evolving towards a universal state.

Woodrow Wilson saw the mandate system as the greatest advance of the century until that time. Mandates, he maintained, ‘put an obligation upon us [developed nations] to look after the interests of undeveloped peoples primarily before we use them for our interest’. The anti-racist African American activist and social scientist W.E.B. Du Bois, no great friend of Wilson, viewed mandates as important to the legitimisation of the principle of international oversight in colonies, and universality of rights. But in practice, Du Bois had to organise his own conference to make his views heard (the Pan-African conference held in Paris in 1919, which the US tried to disrupt), and mandates came with few obligations and no official oversight role for the newly created League of Nations. Internationalism in this case sat comfortably with an imperial view of the order of the world.xx
On the gender front too, there were inherent contradictions in the League’s many roles. Its ‘Social Questions’ bureau may have been regarded by feminists as a space in which women’s international consciousness could be set to work, but as an institution it also regulated international relations in ways that inhibited women’s agency. The ambiguity was palpable in the League’s work with ‘White Slave trafficking’, which even as it made prostitution and sex trafficking an international issue, captured in its moral net the movement of all women outside of nations, when they travelled without male supervision.

We know too well the story of the League’s failures in the 1930s. By the 1940s, the League was in abeyance, its remnant and remaining workers in refuge at Princeton in the US, and its moral stature all but corrupted. In the midst of a new crisis in world affairs, and the anti-imperial mood of the 1940s, few wanted to look back. Instead they looked forward to a new world popularly referred to as ‘one world’.

In 1940, ‘one world’ was not an alliance of airlines, it was the slogan under which Wendell Wilkie (a Republican) campaigned unsuccessfully against the incumbent US presidential candidate Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It was also the title of a book Wilkie published in 1943, which sold a million copies in seven weeks — and 4.5 million within a year in dozens of foreign languages. One world was also the key in which, in 1942, Gary Davis, an American bomber pilot, dubbed himself ‘First World Citizen’, and renounced US citizenship to live and travel as a stateless world citizen on his own world passport. Even though Davis was promoting a concept of global mobility that went against the grain of national sovereignty and border controls, his world citizenship campaign was commended by H.V. Evatt, as well as the more recognisable internationalist Albert Einstein, and the English writer J. B. Priestley, who proposed an Order of World Citizenship.

If that is all too much in the realm of intellectual elites, consider that the one world phenomenon coincided with a plethora of new World Citizenship Clubs, World Federation organisations and societies. There is evidence of the wide-based cosmopolitan tenor of this war-induced mood linking internationalism to anti-colonialism, as captured in early 1945 by Mohandas Gandhi. In a public statement made just prior to the San Francisco conference, Gandhi recalled a famous All India Congress Committee Resolution from August 1942 that had envisioned the solution to the problems of the modern world in ‘a world federation of free nations’:

Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another, the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world’s resources for the common good of all.
The historian Manu Bhagavan argues that Gandhi’s view of internationalism was more radical than the idea of communion of self-interested nation-states, ‘rather a siblinghood of equal states answerable both to their people and to the larger world community’.xxii

Which brings us back to San Francisco, April 1945.

It shouldn’t, couldn’t have been dull. The San Francisco conference certainly ran a long time, from April to June 1945, but they were two rollercoaster months of UN Charter drafting and institution building, before the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and before the war had ended. FDR’s US Government and the San Francisco authorities had recruited one thousand people to stage and service the conference. It was attended by 282 delegates from fifty-one countries bringing with them teams that amounted to 1500 people (the American team alone added up to 174), the combined press and radio contingent of 2636, and churning out between a quarter of a million and two million sheets of documentation daily. Newspapers reported armies of ‘independistas’, lobbyists ringing their own non-governmental agendas, alongside the 2262 military, 400 Red Cross, and 800 Boy Scout helpers. Plenary sessions were held at the Civic Opera House with its 3300 seating capacity. At any one time there were up to twelve committees in session, as well as the constant press conferences, telegramming, and parallel public meetings. The end result was a Charter that set out the terms for the establishment of the UN, and which opened with the startling invocation of ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations’, as if the world’s population, could and did speak with one voice.

For all the thinness of the existing historiography of internationalism in this period, we can be certain that by 1945 the terms ‘one world’, ‘world citizenship’, ‘world community’, along with ‘world consciousness’, had come to the fore of political activity associated with the creation of the UN and its specialised agencies such as UNESCO. We can measure the aspirational height of the bar being set for the new UNO, not only by virtue of the kinds of ideas in circulation, but by the extent of the social movement supporting a program for political and cultural change, by the thickness of the international public sphere. Consider the U.S. State Department’s own sampling which indicated that 60% of the public surveyed had heard or read about plans for an international organisation, and 81% said the US should join a world organisation with police power to maintain world peace.xxiii

The one female American delegate to the San Francisco conference, Virginia Gildersleeve (Dean of Barnard) recorded in her memoirs that she had received 65,500 letters during the conference — of those directed to her rather than the other delegates (and everyone was getting their fair share of the tonnage of mail) 82% were from women — 95% advocated specific additions to the Charter
and ideas, as well as requesting money to have women working for the promotion of the UN and more dialogue with women’s NGOs.""}xxiv

Like the idea of one world, the San Francisco meeting became part of a larger phenomenon in which the intellectual and popular intermingled as anti-nationalist internationalism spread throughout the 1940s — to be sure, the evidence I have collected comes from citizens of existing nation-states, rather than those seeking emancipation from colonialist situations. Geographers, historians, and other social scientists determined not to repeat the mistakes of the 1919 peace busily proposed a variety of ways to avoid future conflicts over territory. Veteran experts of the First World War peacemaking process such as Arnold Toynbee advocated small city states under international supervision, or new federal conglomerates in the Balkans and Central Europe; E.H. Carr argued that ‘the tradition which makes the drawing of frontiers the primary and most spectacular part of peace making has outlived its validity. The urgent need now is to alter not the location but the meaning of frontiers’; the British geographer Arthur Moodie considered linear borders inappropriate in most parts of Europe; and the relatively less imaginative Italian historian in exile Gaetano Salvemini wanted Europe to experiment with American federal-style open-borders, such as those in the tri-state area of Connecticut, New Jersey and New York.""xxv

Federalist thinking predominated in the early 1940s, in sharp contrast to the principle of nationality that was touted as the answer to world security in the 1910s. A European Economic Community/European Union was only one (and in effect perhaps the only acted on) conception of the federal approach to sovereignty floating around in this period, and promoted as the next stop on the road to an evolving world community. The prime models for this federalist fervour sometimes the US, sometimes the USSR. The USSR was seen as more clearly combining anti-nationalist tendencies with a capacity to allow for the self-determination of its own aspiring constitutive states. It was also admired by non-Marxists for its scientific social planning on a mass scale, a dimension of this new one world thinking that defined for many progressives their expectations of the new world organisation.

In the context of ambitions for creating ever larger, rather than smaller, groupings of peoples, even empire had some traction as a form of ‘federation’, when it was not being posited as the antithesis of the anti-colonial hopes vested in the UN. During the war, Hans Kohn, an expatriate of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and the proclaimed ‘father’ of nationalism studies, advocated the return of an ancient concept of empire affording to all peoples the equal protection of a common citizenship and of a rational law. ‘This Empire’, he argued, ‘would mean the end of all imperialism, it would be the consummation and the justification of the best tendencies inherent, though not realised, in the liberal imperialisms of the nineteenth century.”xxvi René Cassin, the French jurist and framer of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, could not disengage his vision of the
implementation of universal human rights from his regard for France as a cosmopolitan empire in which Jews, such as himself, and Muslims, white and black found politico-cultural convergence as French citizens and Patriots. This true France, and French empire, was the cultural fount of the human rights Cassin promoted as both universal and respectful of cultural diversity. Of course, for some, it was the irrepressible allure of the British Empire: and here Keith Hancock enters our story. Hancock had left Australia in 1933 (at age 35) for UK, where he was Professor of History at Birmingham; during the war he worked as official war historian for the War Cabinet Office, and then took a posting as Professor at Oxford, returning to Australia only in 1957, aged 59, to direct the Research School of Social Sciences at ANU.

In 1944, Hancock published *Argument of Empire*, an argument that began with the dismissal of Wilkie’s one worldism and an affirmation of the relevance of the British Empire, as a Commonwealth, for ensuring peaceful co-existence. To begin with, the Commonwealth of Nations, he claimed, had much to ‘teach Europe’, ‘For Europe to-day must learn the lesson of racial toleration, or perish’. ‘My own country, Australia’, he added, ‘is every bit as independent and free as the United States. This freedom has come to Australia by natural evolution and peaceful inheritance. Australia has achieved sovereignty without the pain and loss of separation. Australia belongs to a family, a Commonwealth of democratic nations. […] Well this is how I see it. And it’s how I feel it. I am an Australian.’

Hancock could not have been thinking of white Australia, rather, his mind was on a commonwealth that offered ‘solidarity with a wider society of likeminded peoples’.

Not all Australians would have agreed with Hancock, and some of these other voices had pivotal roles in the processes that established the new international organisation, as well as in promoting alternative versions of internationalism. Kevin Rudd’s 2008 UN General Assembly speech intoned the San Francisco conference of 1945 as a founding moment for global governance, and the role of H.V. Evatt. Evatt, he reminded his audience, had made

‘a significant contribution at the San Francisco conference, particularly on the part of small and medium countries. He ensured that the role of the General Assembly was protected in the structure of the organisation as a whole. And 60 years ago this week he was elected President of the Third General Assembly. Evatt was a patriotic Australian. Evatt was equally a passionate internationalist. Sixty years later, this institution, together with other international institutions of our current order, have yet to realise the vision of those who founded it’. 
Wayne Hudson has stoically covered with great verve the role of Australia at San Francisco, and we have Hasluck’s record of Evatt’s push (pushiness?) for an international court of human rights, and extension of the principle of international trusteeship to all colonies.xxx We tend to forget that Evatt was as important at the San Francisco conference, for forcing the sanctity of domestic sovereignty which undercut all the other attempts at forging a supra-national international organisation.

Rudd could have as legitimately referred to the high-minded former Liberal Prime Minister Stanley Bruce, whose 1938 report on the already dying League (commissioned when Bruce was High Commissioner to London — later he would become Chancellor of ANU, at a time when Hancock and other League and UN veterans were headhunted to ANU) quite uncharacteristically called for its transformation into a body that promoted international economic and social cooperation, peaceful civilisation through economic and humanitarian work, rather than just state diplomacy, as well as more use of the Office of Public Information to generate support for internationalist aims. The Bruce Report’s recommendations made their way into the new UN structure, along with the promotion of the idea of an internationally loyal secretariat. He could also have mentioned Jessie Street, who arrived in San Francisco as a ‘consultant’ of the Australian delegation and proceeded to push the agenda of equal rights for women, workers, and indigenous populations. Street represented quite distinctive sets of international idealism that she put to work in the UN’s Commission for the Status of Women. In October 1945, Street broadcast from London en route to Moscow her vision for Australians of the significance of San Francisco: ‘The achievement of the Conference in forming an all-embracing organisation of the peace-loving nations of the world’, she stated, ‘qualifies it to be considered as one of the most important events in modern history’. She believed that its creation would lead to ‘the growth of democratic inter-nation cooperation, between groups with common interests’. ‘Their possibilities’, she claimed, ‘are limitless’. Even more fundamentally, “The moral force of public opinion” was to be “utilised in the international sphere as effectively as it is in national or family life”.xxxi

Was she right?

It is possible, I think, to paint a picture of mid-twentieth century internationalism as incorporating a broad range of ambitions linked to the notion of a new international world order, and the creation of new international organisation. Amongst these ambitions were:

- An emphasis on forging world community and political unity through regional organisations;
- An interest in transcending the territorial sovereignty of nations through the enunciation of specific rights of mobility and of asylum;
The demand for the right of individuals to be represented in the new international organisation, rather than merely states;

The concern to give individuals the right to petition the UN, and particularly its human rights organs;

The idea of an international organisation that could act to implement human rights;

An interest in adding animal rights to a universal declaration of rights;

An interest in placing ALL colonies under international trusteeship;

An interest in using the new organisation to reinvent economic relations, to contribute to social planning on a world wide scale, and democratise through modernisation and industrialisation;

The idea of a universal auxiliary language;

The idea of an international territory;

The idea that women would have an equal role to play in international political life, as well as the redrawing of the colour line;

Absolute disarmament.

All of these were features of the debate in the 1940s regarding a new ‘world’-identified internationalism and its scope. But I have another list of features that I regard as definitive of the long twentieth century and its internationalism, including:

The popular or social base of internationalism and a predominant emphasis on the international as a significant arena of democratisation and public opinion;

A predominant view in scholarly and popular observation that internationalism and nationalism are equally realistic political stratagems, and in some minds internationalism was the more Realpolitik prospect;

An anti-colonialist (even if not always anti-imperial) mainstream.

Ultimately there was a significant gap between many of the aspirations circulating around San Francisco and the institution that was actually created. To begin with, even if San Francisco 1945 was more ‘democratic’ than Paris in 1919, activists had no right to participate in discussions but had to work through consultants or lobbyists from smaller sympathetic nations such as Haiti, Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Arab States. The Philippines representative, Carlos Romulo, complained he was left to speak on behalf of the 600 million not represented there — a ‘thankless task’. The framework of a UN decided upon at San Francisco was structurally anything but federalist. It was created as a body that represents member states, and is represented by nation-state delegates. Its General Assembly remains unelected, its exclusive Security Council, although now expanded, can...
still use their veto to influence politics in ways they could not in Geneva (this was the price for US and USSR participation). Its declarations, and resolutions, remain unjusticiable, just as the legitimacy of its international machinery (including the World Court) has no compulsory jurisdiction or judicial review authority. The UN is still a conglomeration of states. Its most international aspects are its bureaucracy and its role as an international forum.

In the latter half of the 1940s, the UN’s brand-spanking new Department of Trusteeship and Trusteeship Council (the replacements for mandates) exhibited many of the contradictions intrinsic to the new world order. The UN Charter offered up the possibility of international oversight of all colonies, even as it carefully delimited the capacity of the new organisation to compel colonial powers to either hand over mandates, or other territories, or to intervene in its operations. The operation of the Trusteeship Council was for many years weighted in favour of the colonial powers, and the UN Department of Trusteeship was a hothouse of ideological clashes between liberal imperialists and more radical anti-colonialists. As for international mindedness, Street ended her broadcast by declaiming that ‘At the meetings I have addressed, both in the United States and over here [in London] there is the same lack of interest and knowledge about the United Nations Organisation’.

It would take a lot longer lecture to explore the extent to which one world was a shared language, along with world government, world citizenship, federalism, and even Commonwealth in the mid-twentieth century. It is useful to remember however that the fifth biggest funder of the UN in this period was post-independence India, which was also a key location of UNESCO social science projects; states such as Brazil, Haiti, were all keen supporters.

If I were to make the movie of twentieth-century internationalism, at this point I would use a split screen, bringing together the intersecting lives of a number of individuals whose own life stories illuminate this period, its often self-conscious ‘cosmopolitanism’, one worldism, its roots in the early twentieth century, and the attempts to reach beyond the limits of the legacy of the long nineteenth century — a legacy that included the social and political determinism of race hierarchies, and the teleology of national sovereignty, as well as assumptions about the viability of an international public sphere, and the significance of internationalism for social and economic as well as political democratisation.

By the end of the 1940s, the ‘one world’ ambitions of the UN — whether as a state of mind or political project — had been given away, sold off against the internal threat of McCarthyism and Cold War Politics. By then, there was a long accruing list of abandoned international ambitions. But the story of the twentieth century as the great age of internationalism does not end there. Developments across the twentieth century, including the recurring sense of an expanding
international society, presaged the kinds of changes that came into effect in the 1970s, the decade now described by historians as ‘a definite phase of globalization’, aiding the emergence of ‘a genuine world community’.xxxii

Through the 1970s there was a 500% increase in the number of inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations (nearly 80,000 by the early 1980s). This extraordinary growth of particularly NGOs has historians remarking on an extraordinarily rapid growth in ‘global consciousness’.xxxiii The UN is an important marker of this seismic shift in the international public sphere that it had helped to foster. By 1970, it had grown into an organisation that, as Leland Goodrich — a former employee and stalwart student of the UN — argued, participants at the San Francisco Conference of 1945 would have found it difficult to recognise.xxxiv It now had 132 member states (it started with fifty-one, and currently has 192), seventy per cent of which belonged to those parts of the world contemporaries interchangeably classified as developing, the have-nots, the non-white countries, the Third World, the South. The UN’s as infamous 1970s activism on behalf of a new international economic order, which aimed to level up economic opportunities between North and South, may have had something to do with the simultaneous distancing of the Western democracies from the UN. The UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim (whose personal links to the race crimes of the Nazi period were exposed only belatedly) was heard to have remarked that ‘some people were shocked to see the UN reflect the “entirely new balance of power in the world”’.xxxv Among those people perhaps was the US President Gerald Ford who cautioned the General Assembly in 1974 against succumbing to the ‘tyranny of the majority’; and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the United States 12th Ambassador to the United Nations (1975-76), who ridiculed the UN as ‘the theatre of the absurd’; or the contemporary social scientists who portrayed this new UN as the axis of a North-South ‘colour’-line transversal to the East-West tracks of the ‘Iron Curtain’, and as dangerous in its threat to world peace.xxxvi

Here I would note the significance of this period in the so-called expansion of global consciousness (or in the terms of other contemporary theorists such as Hedley Bull, the expansion of international society), especially in its relation to a development that marked the 1990s, namely the coinage of the term ‘post-internationalism’. This term was intended to reflect a new reality in which (as one political scientist put it) ‘more and more of the interactions that sustain world politics unfold without the direct involvement of nations and states’.xxxvii

Is that where we are, in a post-internationalist world in which nation and states have a reduced role? Have we moved to a new age of internationalism, as post-internationalism? To be sure, internationalism is a work that is rarely used these days, especially not by political leaders, and not even as a basis of political or economic claim-making. There is no longer a relevant association between the international and the idea or ideal of democratisation. Nor is there any longer a
dominant assumption about the international as a point of progress away from the nation-state which has retained its status as the inevitable locus of human, or even political, community. Yet the speeches of liberal-democratic leaders such as Obama and Kevin Rudd are also evidence of the persistence of the nation-state and older regimes of political ideology, even as they point to the abandonment of the internationalism that was nationalism’s competing ambition throughout the twentieth century. Rudd’s speeches to the UN General Assembly remind us that UN these days is most effectively a lieu de mémoire — a site for remembering a fuzzy picture of the heyday of internationalism — a movie-like memory drawn on to posit the formation of an exclusive nation-based forum for the resolution of world problems.

We might not agree on how the global world we live in should be described, the extent of its globalisation, whether it is more or less international. Nor would I advocate nostalgia for the passing of twentieth century internationalism — no matter whether we think of it as the internationalism of nation-states, or the internationalism of the Enlightenment progress towards a universal humanity, as liberal, socialist, feminist, or anti-colonialist. Historians understand more than anyone else, that there is no progress in history, and no utopian past. But it is useful at times, in trying to understand where we are, the world we do live in, to come to some understanding of the world that we have lost. That world, I have been trying to argue, was one in which the specific term ‘internationalism’ had significant political claim-making status, underwritten by an older story of the progress of humanity into ever widening circles of association, of nations as an historical pit stop on the way to somewhere else, in which the international evoked the challenge of economic ad political democratisation. It was the combination of those expectations in the context of a century darkened with threats of man-made destruction that made the twentieth century the great age of internationalism. Those threats are still with us, in all manner of forms, but we have already lost the capacity to meet them with anything more innovative than the protection of state sovereignty, and the misnomer of a post-internationalist future.

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\(^{7}\) The articles were published a year later as the book, *War, Peace and the Future: A consideration of nationalism and internationalism, and of the relation of women to war* (London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1916).


Others included Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, the British Empire, Canada, Chile, the Republic of China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Italy, Liberia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru/Iran, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Luxembourg, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Ireland, Ethiopia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Turkey, Iraq, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Ecuador.

*see* Sluga, *The Nation, Psychology and International Politics*, Ch. 5.


*see* Sluga, *The Nation, Psychology and International Politics*, p. 11.


*ibid.* p. 319.


*see* K. Hancock, *Argument of Empire* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1943), pp. 15, 16.


*see* Iriye, *Global Community*, pp. 126, 129.


*see* See Sluga, ‘The Transformation of International Institutions’.